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Abstract We argue that the epistemic modal ‘might’ is a generator of alternatives
in the sense of Hamblin semantics (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002) or inquisitive
semantics (Ciardelli, Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009). Building on methodologies
from the psychology of reasoning, we show that ‘might’ patterns with disjunctions
and with indefinites in giving rise to a particular kind of illusory inference. The best
extant accounts of these illusory inferences crucially involve alternatives, paired
with matching strategies (Walsh & Johnson-Laird 2004) or with question-answer
dynamics (Koralus & Mascarenhas 2013). Our results constitute further steps toward
convergence between theories and methodologies in natural language semantics and
the psychology of reasoning.
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1 Introduction
The semantics of epistemic modals has puzzled linguists and philosophers for
decades. Here we address a debate that hasn’t been under the spotlight in recent
years: the role of ‘might’ as a means of directing hearer attention by generating a
single alternative in the sense of Hamblin semantics or inquisitive semantics.
Disjunction and indefinites are generators of alternatives par excellence. They
induce a particular kind of illusory inference whose extant accounts all agree must be
due to the presence of alternatives. We show experimentally that ‘might’ induces the
same kind of illusory inference. Our results provide arguments from the psychology
of reasoning in favor of particular theories of ‘might’.
* We thank Benjamin Spector and the audience of WIP-LANG at Ecole Normale Supérieure for
extremely useful comments. The work presented here was funded by Agence Nationale de la
Recherche grants ANR-17-EURE-0017 (Frontiers of Cognition) and ANR-18-CE28-0008 (Between
Language and Reasoning).
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In the remainder of this introduction, we present the minimal required back-
ground knowledge from the semantics literature on alternatives, the relevant theories
from the psychology of reasoning, and the central empirical discoveries about the
kinds of illusory inferences of interest. Section 2 presents our study and results, and
section 3 examines the consequences of our results for a range of theories of the
semantics of ‘might’. Section 4 concludes with remarks on ongoing work.
1.1 Illusory inferences from disjunction
Recent efforts to seek convergence between natural language semantics and the
psychology of reasoning have led to articulated theories of interpretive processes
and general-purpose reasoning. In particular, the erotetic theory of reasoning of
Koralus & Mascarenhas (2013) incorporates linguistic insights into a variant of
mental models theory of reasoning (Johnson-Laird 1983) to account for a class
of attractive fallacies known as illusory inferences from disjunction. Consider the
example in (1), heavily simplified from the original examples discovered by Walsh
& Johnson-Laird (2004).
(1) John speaks English and Mary speaks French, or else Bill speaks German.
John speaks English.
Fallacious conclusion: Mary speaks French.
The problem in (1), as well as multiple structurally identical problems, has an
acceptance rate between 80% and 85% (Walsh & Johnson-Laird 2004; Mascarenhas
& Koralus 2017; Koralus & Mascarenhas 2018). Yet, the inference in (1) is a fallacy.
Suppose Bill speaks German (modeling premise 1) and John speaks English (premise
2), but Mary does not speak French. This is a model of the premises but not the
conclusion, and the inference in (1) is thus invalid.
1.2 Mental models and illusory inferences
Building on the mental-models explanation of these fallacies by Walsh & Johnson-
Laird (2004), the erotetic theory of reasoning of Koralus & Mascarenhas (2013)
offers an account of this and related illusory inferences that proposes that a question-
answer dynamic is at the core of these fallacies. For ease of exposition, let us
consider the logical structure behind the example in (1).
(2) (a∧b)∨ c
a
Fallacious conclusion: b
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Following Hamblin semantics (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002; Alonso-Ovalle
2006) and inquisitive semantics (Groenendijk 2008; Mascarenhas 2009), the erotetic
theory of reasoning takes the disjunction in the first premise of (2) to raise an
issue, putting forth two alternatives: a∧b and c.1 The reasoner is now effectively
entertaining a question, and she will seek to find the most expedient way of answering
it or dispelling it. As it turns out, the second premise offers a hint of an answer: the
second premise a is related to the first alternative a∧b rather than the second c, and
the reasoner rushes to pick an answer: the right alternative from the first premise is
a∧b, whence b follows by a mental-models analog of conjunction elimination.2
1.3 Alternatives in language beyond disjunction
If the attractiveness of fallacious schemata as in (2) is to be explained in terms of
the presence of alternatives in the interpretation of the first (disjunctive) premise,
then we expect other linguistic items that have been argued to raise alternatives of a
similar kind to produce similar illusory inferences.
Both in the Hamblin semantics (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002) and the inquisitive
semantics (Ciardelli 2009) traditions, indefinites are akin to wh-questions. An
expression such as “some pilot” is assigned roughly the same meaning as “which
pilot,” namely the set of all pilots. Accordingly, a sentence like “Some pilot writes
poems” is analyzed as the set of all propositions of the shape “x writes poems,” for x
a pilot. In other words, the meaning of the question “Which pilot writes poems?”
Under this analysis, the erotetic theory predicts that the example below should give
rise to an illusory inference.
1 Strictly speaking, the Hamblin semantics tradition postulates an existential quantifier over alternatives
at the very top of any logical form, ensuring that classical truth conditions are delivered instead of
sets of alternatives. It is inquisitive semantics that dispenses with this final step. With that said, we
think it is reasonable to slightly adjust standard Hamblin semantics and do without existential closure
at the top, maintaining existential closure for embedded clauses.
2 This informal exposition of the erotetic theory of reasoning suffices for the purposes of this article,
but it is crucial to note that the theory is given in a fully explicit form by Koralus & Mascarenhas
(2013). They give a full regimentation of mental model theory in terms of truth-maker semantics
(van Fraassen 1969; Fine 2012) with an inquisitive / Hamblin semantics for disjunction, and they
define a small set of dynamic operations on mental models. The central operation is Q(uestion)-
Update, which checks whether the workspace of reasoning contains a mental model with more than
one alternative (a question) and attempts to answer it with the information in the mental-model
interpretation of the premise being integrated. In the original (2013) formulation of the theory, this
operation simply checked for overlap: the alternatives in the question that had the most overlap
in content with the information in the answer were kept, while all others dropped from attention.
More recent experimental data have shown that overlap is too strong a requirement (Sablé-Meyer
& Mascarenhas 2019). The novel data in the present article do not require these more sophisticated
theories, so we use the original formulation of the theory.
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(3) Some pilot writes poems.
John is a pilot.
Fallacious conclusion: John writes poems.
Assuming a finite domain, we can think of the meaning of the first premise of
(3) as a large disjunction of conjunctions. This is given schematically in (4), for P a
predicate for “pilot” and W a predicate for “writes poems.” Notice how structurally
we have a generalized case of the illusory inference with disjunction in (2).
(4) (Pa∧Wa)∨ (Pb∧Wb)∨·· ·∨ (Pz∧Wz)
Pa
Fallacious conclusion: Wa
Mascarenhas & Koralus (2017) found that inferences like (3) were in fact attrac-
tive, with acceptance rates around 35%, significantly above the baseline for mistakes
established by invalid controls without alternative-generating elements. This demon-
strates the existence of the predicted illusory inferences with alternative-generating
linguistic operators besides disjunction.
1.4 Reasoning vs. interpretation
Illusory inferences from disjunction as in (1) have acceptance rates around 85%,
while illusory inferences with indefinites as in (3) are accepted around 35% of the
time. Why the different acceptance rates, if both disjunctions and indefinites produce
alternatives according to our best semantic theories?
Mascarenhas (2014) showed that the disjunction inferences are amenable to a
pragmatic account. As an alternative to mental-models accounts, we can predict
the observed conclusion assuming an entirely classical reasoning module, acting
on pragmatically strengthened meanings of the premises. The computations are far
from easy, but on most modern theories of scalar implicature (e.g. Sauerland 2004;
Spector 2007) the first premise of the illusory inference from disjunction in (5a) is
predicted to be interpreted as in (5b), a fact Spector (2007) had already observed
outside the context of reasoning problems.
(5) a. (a∧b)∨ c
b. (a∧b∧¬c)∨ (c∧¬a∧¬b)
Assuming (5a) is interpreted as in (5b), and incorporating the second premise
a, the conclusion b is no fallacy at all. It follows classically from the conjunction
of the two premises. Crucially, no absolving implicature is predicted by any theory
of scalar implicature in the market for illusory inferences with indefinites. Picat &
Mascarenhas (2019) argue that, rather than being competing accounts, the erotetic
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theory and the scalar-implicature account are two possible routes leading to the same
inference-making behavior in the case of the illusory inference from disjunction. For
the indefinites case, only the erotetic theory predicts a fallacy, the scalar-implicature
route is blocked, explaining its lower endorsement rate.3
2 Illusory inferences with ‘might’
Ciardelli et al. (2009) argue that the weak epistemic operator ‘might’ is an alternative-
generating operator, putting forth a single alternative and drawing attention to it.
Ciardelli et al. (2009) give an inquisitive semantics for ‘might’, where the meaning
of a sentence might(p∧q) is (p∧q)∨>. In inquisitive semantics, this corresponds
to the question {p∧ q,>}. Crucially, the sentence as a whole is not a tautology:
while it is informationally idle (that is an update with this sentence will exclude
no possibilities from any common ground), it contains two alternatives, and is thus
distinct from the interpretation of a sentence >.
This inquisitive semantics predicts two alternatives for ‘might’-sentences, but
one of those alternatives is the trivial alternative, to which it makes little or no sense
to draw attention. Effectively then, a ‘might’-sentence in this semantics offers one
alternative to focus on, in the example under consideration the p∧q alternative.
If indeed ‘might’ raises an alternative in the sense of inquisitive semantics and
Hamblin semantics, then ‘might’ should produce illusory inferences in the right
configuration. Schematically, we expect the pattern in (6) to be attractive.
(6) might(a∧b)
a
Fallacious conclusion: b
2.1 Design
We tested this hypothesis experimentally. Our target reasoning problems had the
structure in (6), instantiated in (7).
(7) Miranda might play the piano and be afraid of spiders.
Miranda plays the piano.
Fallacious conclusion: Miranda is afraid of spiders.
Earlier experimental investigations on illusory inferences from disjunctions and
indefinites found a small but significant effect of premise order: fewer fallacies
3 Picat & Mascarenhas (2019) give corroborating experimental evidence for this proposal, showing that
the disjunction case is affected by cognitive load, reducing pragmatic interpretations and decreasing
the rate of fallacious responses, while the indefinite case is unaffected by this manipulation.
553
Mascarenhas and Picat
were committed when the premises were presented in reverse order, in line with the
erotetic theory’s account in terms of question-answer dynamics (Mascarenhas &
Koralus 2017; Koralus & Mascarenhas 2018). Accordingly, we tested inferences
like (7) in reverse order as well.
Fallacious conclusions in response to an inference like (7) could be due to
two confounds we controlled for. Firstly, it could be that the first premise alone
prompts a fallacy, perhaps by raising the probability of the conjunction sufficiently
in the judgment of participants. This would still be of interest, but it would not
constitute an illusory inference of the kind we find with disjunctions and indefinites.
Secondly, we wanted to make sure that any mistakes we found were due to a bona
fide question-answer dynamic, as predicted by the erotetic theory. Consequently, we
tested as controls both the first premise alone, and what we call a “flat” version of
the inference with the same context-change potential, exemplified in (8).
(8) Miranda plays the piano and might be afraid of spiders.
Fallacious conclusion: Miranda is afraid of spiders.
It is useful to contrast the reversed version of the inference with this flat version,
schematically:
(9) a. REVERSED TARGET
a
might(a∧b)
Fallacious conclusion: b
b. FLAT
a∧might(b)
Fallacious conclusion: b
In the context of the first premise a of (9a), an utterance of might(a∧b) should
be contextually equivalent to might(b). The idea behind the flat version in (9b) is to
exploit this contextual equivalence: the two discourses in (9) should yield identical
results, unless something like the question-answer dynamic postulated by the erotetic
theory of reasoning is at play.
Summing up, we tested the following four conditions in a between-subjects
design, due to the high degree of similarity between the stimuli in the conditions.
(10) a. CANONICAL might(a∧b), a ` b
b. P1 might(a∧b) ` b
c. FLAT a∧might(b) ` b
d. REVERSED a, might(a∧b) ` b
We further tested valid and invalid controls based on modus ponens, as schema-
tized in (11).
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(11) a. VALID MP if a then b, a ` b
b. INVALID MP if a then b, c ` b
We recruited 210 subjects on Amazon MechanicalTurk, 66% were female and
their mean age was 36 (ranging from 18 to 74, σ = 11.4). Participants were assigned
to one of the four target conditions. They each solved 14 reasoning problems,
8 targets and the rest controls. In each case, participants were given premises
and a proposed conclusion, and asked whether the conclusion followed from the
premises. We gave participants two examples in the instructions to the experiment,
exemplifying one valid and one invalid inference, with materials and connectives
that did not occur elsewhere in the experiment.
We predicted that
i. canonical and reversed targets should be accepted significantly more than the
baseline for mistakes established by invalid controls, diagnosing a fallacy;
ii. the acceptance of canonical and reversed targets should depend on the pres-
ence of the second premise, so that P1 targets should be lower than canonical
and reversed targets;
iii. flat targets should be much lower than canonical and reversed targets, and
indeed indistinguishable from the baseline for mistakes established by invalid
controls;
iv. canonical targets should be somewhat more attractive than reversed targets,
instantiating the order effects observed for other illusory inferences.
2.2 Results
We excluded from the analysis participants who reported having taken graduate-
level courses in natural language semantics or pragmatics, and participants who
reported using notes during the experiment. In total, we excluded 64 participants.
We analyzed the remaining data using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the proportion
of yes-answers given to each type of inference and control. The details of the tests
are given in Table 1, while Figure 1 summarizes the results.
2.3 Discussion
Most of our predictions were borne out:
i. Canonical and reversed targets were significantly more accepted than mis-
takes were made on no-controls. This is diagnostic of a reasoning fallacy.
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Prediction Statistic P-value
(i) V = 805 p < 0.01
(ii) W = 1485 p < 0.05
(iii) W = 1683.5 p < 0.001
(iv) W = 533.5 p > 0.8
Table 1 Details of the statistical analysis; all comparisons were analyzed with
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests; for comparison (i) we performed a paired
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (within subjects)
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Figure 1 Results for the relevant conditions in the experiment; error bars indicate
the standard error of the mean
ii. Canonical and reversed targets were significantly more accepted than P1
targets. Thus, the fallacy cannot be explained by the first premise alone.
iii. Canonical and reversed targets were significantly more accepted than flat
targets. This is in line with an erotetic account of the fallacy.
iv. However, we detected no difference between canonical and reversed targets,
suggesting no order effect. We can understand this null result by appealing to
effect size. Experiments showing the existence of order effects for fallacies
with similar acceptance rates required very large numbers of participants
due to the small effect size observed (Mascarenhas & Koralus 2017). The
current experiment was very plausibly underpowered to answer this particular
question.
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3 General discussion
We’ve concluded that illusory inferences with ‘might’ exist, as predicted by accounts
of ‘might’ as an inquisitive or alternative-generating operator. These cannot be
explained away as resulting from the first premise alone, and they seem to require a
dynamic operation as evidenced by the absence of fallacies for flat targets.
What do the results of our experimental investigation entail for existing analyses
of the semantics of ‘might’, and existing theories of how alternatives figure into
human reasoning? We turn our attention to four relatively broad possibilities, which
we believe map out a considerable portion of the relevant conceptual space.
3.1 Inquisitive semantics and the erotetic theory of reasoning
As discussed in the introduction to this article, Ciardelli et al. (2009) offer an
inquisitive semantics for ‘might’ where
might(ϕ)≡ ϕ ∨> .
Armed with this semantics, we need only import the propositional erotetic
account of reasoning of Koralus & Mascarenhas (2013) to derive the observed
fallacious behavior as a special case of the original illusory inference from disjunction
in (1).
3.2 Scalar Implicatures and interpretation-based “fallacies”
Illusory inferences from ‘might’ have comparable acceptance rates to those with
indefinites, rather than disjunctions. Following Picat & Mascarenhas (2019), we
expect these inferences to have only one source, erotetic reasoning. That is, there
should be no scalar implicature of either premise that derives the “fallacy” as a result
of valid reasoning. Indeed, in order to validate the observed conclusion, we would
need for the first premise of the inference to have the implicature in (12).
(12) ♦(a∧b)∧¬♦(a∧¬b)
i.e. ♦(a∧b)∧(a→ b)
We know of no theory of pragmatics that would predict such an implicature for
the first premise of our inferences with ‘might’, confirming our expectations.
3.3 Relational semantics
Assuming the relevant ordering between possible worlds is well founded (the limit as-
sumption), Kratzer’s (1991) semantics for modality predicts that a sentence might(ϕ)
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will be true just in case there is a ϕ-world among the best-ranked worlds. The ex-
istential quantifier over possible worlds in these truth conditions can be given an
inquisitive semantics just like that of indefinite expressions. Along with a few
plausible assumptions, there is a strategy for accounting for our data in a relational
semantics such as Kratzer’s.
(13) a. Assertion as truth in the actual world
When asserting a proposition ϕ , a speaker communicates (their belief) that
ϕ holds in the actual world.
b. Reflexivity
The epistemic modal base is reflexive, that is w ∈ f (w).
c. Inquisitiveness of existentials and erotetics
The existential quantifier that occurs in the truth conditions of a sentence
with ‘might’ is inquisitive. Human reasoning is erotetic, and in particular
inquisitive existential quantifiers raise questions that are resolved along the
lines sketched in section 1.3 for illusory inferences with indefinites.
Under these assumptions, our first premise might(a∧ b) provides some infor-
mation about the existence of a possible world, and draws attention to the question
“which is this best-ranked a∧ b-world we’re discussing?” Asserting the second
premise then states that the actual world is an a-world. Now erotetic mechanisms
kick in: the actual world is an a world, and this points in the direction of answer-
ing the question at hand with “the actual world is the best-ranked a∧ b-world in
question.” From here b follows immediately.
3.4 Probabilistic semantics
Lassiter (2016) proposes a probabilistic semantics for ‘might’, where
might(ϕ)≡ P(ϕ)> θ ,
for P a probability function and θ a contextually determined standard. To assess
how this semantics handles our inferential data, we need to formulate a theory
of reasoning with probabilities. One standard notion of validity in probabilistic
approaches to the psychology reasoning is p-validity (Oaksford & Chater 2007;
Johnson-Laird, Khemlani & Goodwin 2015). An inference is p-valid just in case the
conclusion is no less probable than its premises. That is, for ϕ a conclusion and Γ a
set of premises,
P(ϕ)≥ P(Γ) .
Under this operationalization of probabilistic reasoning, we see no principled
obstacle to a probabilistic semantics for ‘might’ incorporating our findings. However,
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the notion of p-validity has mostly been used to great effect in accounts of conditional
reasoning, but it is otherwise a problematic notion. The issue deserves a detailed
discussion that is outside the scope of this article. But we can illustrate the central
oddity with an example: take a fair lottery with 100 tickets, numbered from 1 to 100.
From “the winning ticket is 3” it follows by p-validity that “the winning ticket is 4
or 5.” Relatedly, any proposition either entails its negation, is entailed by it, or both.
We submit that these predictions are almost certainly on the wrong track.
Alternatively, one can consider a more conservative notion of probabilistic
reasoning using conditional probabilities. For ϕ a conclusion, Γ a set of premises,
and τ a contextually determined standard, we could say that ϕ follows from Γ just
in case
P(ϕ|Γ)> τ .
As before, a detailed discussion cannot quite be dispensed with. But we note that
the problems raised above for p-validity needn’t arise for this notion of probabilistic
reasoning. If the standard τ is reasonable (that is high) enough, the problematic
cases will not be valid. For the lottery case for example, conditionalizing on the
winning ticket being number 3 will in fact reduce the probability of the winning
ticket being 4 or 5 to zero.
But this move comes with its own open questions. In (14a) we spell out the
predicted acceptance conditions for canonical and reversed targets, and in (14b) the
predicted acceptance conditions for flat targets.
(14) a. CANONICAL / REVERSED
P(b|a & P(a∧b)> θ)> τ
b. FLAT
P(b|a & P(b)> θ)> τ
The issue is whether the two conditional probabilities can be distinguished.
One would need to spell out and look at the details of a semantics for a probability
language with second order probabilities. But at first glance, it is reasonable to
wonder whether, upon conjunction with a, the probability of a∧ b should reduce
to that of b alone. If so, then the two sets of premises might well be equivalent,
which would make them indistinguishable, going against the results we report in this
article. The question is open as far as we can see, and deserves attention.
4 Conclusions
We have shown that ‘might’ induces illusory inferences comparable to those pro-
duced by indefinites. This constitutes the first experimental argument in favor of a
theory of ‘might’ along the lines of what’s proposed by Ciardelli et al. (2009). In a
559
Mascarenhas and Picat
nutshell, ‘might’ is an alternative-generating element, drawing attention to a single
possibility. In ongoing work, we are investigating other weak modals with the same
methods, as well as other linguistic elements that have been argued on theoretical
grounds to be generators of alternatives.
One speculative but promising conjecture emerges from this work. It is clear that
linguistic expertise is essential in the study of the psychology of human reasoning.
Virtually the totality of work in this field uses linguistically presented reasoning and
decision problems to diagnose failures of reasoning, so a thorough understanding
of interpretive processes is indispensable. But the methods of the psychology of
reasoning can be illuminating to the field of natural language semantics as well.
If our theories and our interpretation of these experimental results are on the right
track, then illusory inferences of the sort discussed here can serve as novel diagnostic
tools for the presence of alternative-generating elements in semantics.
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